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Notes
SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSIBILITY OF A NON-PARTY




Until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v.
Brady,! the Pennsylvania judiciary adhered to the orthodox view that a
non-party witness' prior inconsistent statements were not admissible as
substantive evidence. 2 As a result, in cases where a testifying witness
contradicted his prior statements, counsel had virtually no recourse but
to plead surprise and hope to get the prior statements admitted for the
purpose of impeaching the witness' testimony. 3 If admitted for that pur-
l. 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walter, 498 Pa. 33, 39 n.2, 444 A.2d 653, 656
n.2 (1982) (disapproving lower court opinion applying modern rule, stating
modern rule was never applicable in Pennsylvania); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467
Pa. 123, 135-36 n.5, 354 A.2d 875, 880-81 n.5 (1976) (court noted strong criti-
cism of it but applied it to facts of case); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584,
590 n.2, 307 A.2d 245, 248 n.2 (1973) (noting that substantive admissibility
does not violate confrontation clause, but adhering to orthodox rule).
3. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251, at 744 (3d ed.
1984) [hereinafter C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE]. McCormick cites two alternatives
to substantive admissibility of prior statements: impeachment and support for a
witness' credibility where the prior statement is consistent with the in-court testi-
mony. Id.; see also Ordover, Surprise! That Damaging Turncoat Witness Is Still With
Us: An Analysis of Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403, 5 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 65, 67 (1976-77) [hereinafter Ordover, Rules Analysis] (where prosecution,
prior to adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 607, could prove surprise and
damage by a witness' prior inconsistent statement, it could then only be admit-
ted to impeach). In Pennsylvania, the element of surprise is not an essential
element for the introduction of a witness' prior statements for the purpose of
impeaching his testimony. See, e.g., Brady, 510 Pa. at 134, 507 A.2d at 72; Com-
monwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 39, 444 A.2d 653, 656 (1982). In Waller, for
example, appellant was shot while sitting in a car with another man. Id. at 36,
444 A.2d at 655. Appellant was later charged with shooting the man who alleg-
edly had shot him while appellant was being driven to the hospital. Id. The man
who had been sitting with appellant in the car testified that he neither saw appel-
lant with a gun nor heard gun shots. Id. at 39, 444 A.2d at 657. This statement
was inconsistent with a prior statement given by the witness. Id. The Waller
court stated that courts have discretion to admit prior inconsistent statements to
impeach based on several of the following factors: (1) whether the testimony
was unexpected and thus "surprised" the party who called the witness to testify;
(2) whether the testimony was. contradictory; (3) whether the testimony was
harmful or injurious to the party having called the witness to testify; and
(4) whether the scope of cross-examination during which the prior statement
(471)
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pose, counsel could only hope that the jury would consider the state-
ment as substantive evidence despite a judicial instruction to the
contrary. 4 Otherwise, the damage done to a case by a "turncoat wit-
ness" could-be devastating. 5
Responding to criticism by legal commentators, 6 other courts, 7 and
was introduced was excessive. Id. at 39, 444 A.2d at 656. Despite such factors,
the discretionary power of the courts in this regard has been construed liberally
so that "the tendency of the courts is to permit parties to show the truth without
strict regard to technicalities." Id. at 39, 444 A.2d at 657 (quoting Common-
wealth v. Smith, 424 Pa. 544, 548, 227 A.2d 653, 655 (1967)) (emphasis omit-
ted). Essentially, prior inconsistent statements have been used to impeach
without the element of surprise when the interests of truth and justice so re-
quire. See Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 137, 354 A.2d 875, 881 (1976).
4. See Ordover, Rules Analysis, supra note 3, at 66. This practice was both
acknowledged and prohibited in Pennsylvania as early as 1839, when the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court noted that a witness' prior statements were introduced
"ostensibly to discredit him, but, in truth, to operate as independent evidence"
when submitted to the jury. Smith v. Price, 8 Watts 447, 448 (1839) (per
curiam). Similarly, McCormick notes that limiting instructions employed by
courts to ensure that the prior inconsistent statements are considered only for
their impeachment value are likely to go unheeded by the jury. C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 251, at 746; see also United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d
183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975) (despite limiting instruction, it is difficult for jury to
distinguish between impeachment and substantive evidence); Rowe v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) ("The repetitive effect of
calling attention to the prior inconsistent statement by the instruction ... high-
light[s] the matter ... making [the jury] more inclined to rely on the statement
than to disregard it.").
5. See McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evi-
dence, 25 TEX. L. REV. 573, 575 (1947) [hereinafter McCormick, Turncoat Witness].
A turncoat witness is a witness who has on some prior occasion told a different
story than that to which he is testifying on the stand. Id. In his article, McCor-
nick cites factual situations in which turncoat witnesses changed the outcome of
particular proceedings and states that the orthodox rule is "poisonous to the
interests of a party who has had the misfortune of having his crucial witness
persuaded, suborned, seduced, or intimidated into changing his story." Id.
6. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 251 (3d ed. 1984); 3A
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1018 (Chadbourn rev.
1970); McCormick, Turncoat Witness, supra note 5; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
McCormick wages his criticism of the orthodox rule by attacking its hearsay
rationale and asserting that the witness' prior statements are actually more trust-
worthy than his subsequent in-court testimony. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra
note 3, § 251, at 745. According to McCormick, prior statements are more relia-
ble than subsequent testimony because they are made nearer in time to the
event that they describe. Id. In fact, McCormick notes that other exceptions to
the hearsay rule are also based on an assumption of fresher memory. Id. Mc-
Cormick further notes that the requirement of oath is no longer a practical
means of assuring that the testimony is trustworthy, and thus is not a valid basis
for excluding a witness' prior inconsistent statements from substantive admissi-
bility. Id. at 744.
Wigmore also assails the orthodox rule, arguing that it often precludes a
party from making out a prima facie case because crucial evidence contained
within a witness' prior statements is inadmissible under the orthodox rule. J.
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1018, at 996 n.2. Moreover, Wigmore states that the
472
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even Pennsylvania's own judiciary, 8 the Brady court discarded the "anti-
orthodox view is unrealistic in that it requires that extreme care be taken in
framing the jury charge. Id. However, Wigmore notes that even if the charge is
properly framed, jurors are required to perform "mental gymnastics" in trying
to discern between evidence admissible for its substantive value and that used
only for impeachment. Id.
Similarly, Morgan attacks the orthodox rule, calling it "pious fraud." Mor-
gan, supra note 6, at 193. Morgan notes the concern that the abandonment of
the orthodox rule would result in a greater opportunity for the manufacture of
evidence. However, he also notes that the opportunity for reconsideration
would likely influence the witness' later testimony, not that made closer in time
to the event that it describes. Id. Like Wigmore, Morgan also notes the ten-
dency ofjuries to consider the evidence for its substantive value despite a limit-
ing instruction. Id.
For a further discussion of criticism of the orthodox rule in terms of the
particular benefits afforded by substantive admissibility of a witness' prior incon-
sistent statements, see infra notes 65-68, 71 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88, 94 (Alaska 1971) (reasons underly-
ing orthodox rule are without merit; hearsay rationale is inapplicable to prior
inconsistent statements); State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz. 135, 142, 515 P.2d 880, 887
(1973) (futile to ask fact-finder to consider statement only for impeachment);
People v. Freeman, 20 Cal. App. 3d 488, 494, 97 Cal. Rptr. 717, 721-22 (1971)
(change in story infers that witness "has something to hide" and provides prior
statement with greater indicia of reliability); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 864,
286 S.E.2d 717, 722 (1982) (rejection of orthodox rule and adoption of modern
rule will "increase the capacity of our criminal justice system to discover the
truth"); Watkins v. State, 446 N.E.2d 949, 959 (Ind. 1983) (substantive admissi-
bility warranted "because it permits the admission ... of major testimonial evi-
dence of guilt that would be lost [under the orthodox rule] because it had not
been subject to cross-examination at the time of its utterance"); State v. Lott,
207 Kan. 602, 606, 485 P.2d 1314, 1317 (1971) (abandonment of orthodox rule
in favor of substantive admissibility designed to deal with "turncoat witness"
problem); Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Ky. 1982) ("no jus-
tification" exists for not allowing prior inconsistent statements to be used as
substantive evidence); Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co. 699 S.W.2d 423, 425-26 (Mo.
1985) (en banc) ("The traditional rule requiring the exclusion of all prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive evidence is flawed .... The chief flaw is that
the inconsistent statements of witnesses often are relevant to more than just the
credibility of the witness.") (citations omitted); State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291,
297 (N.D. 1973) (most protections afforded by orthodox rule are also provided
by substantive admissibility when witness testifies and is subject to cross-exami-
nation); State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 581, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982) (basis of
orthodox rule no longer valid since oath no longer provides strong assurance of
truth and opportunity for cross-examination and observance of demeanor af-
forded at current trial) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 248 Ga. 858, 863, 286 S.E.2d
717, 721 (1982)), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1984); Vogel v. State, 96 Wis. 2d
372, 381, 291 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1980) ("[T]here is no impediment to substan-
tive use of [a witness'] .. .prior inconsistent statement ....").
8. See Commonwealth v. Thirkield, 502 Pa. 542, 543, 467 A.2d 323, 324
(1983) (per curiam) (McDermott, J., dissenting) ("Limiting the admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements . . .severely impedes the truth-determining pro-
cess."); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 146, 354 A.2d 875, 886 (1976)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (orthodox rule "serves only to keep relevant and relia-
ble evidence from the jury. Its result serves no greater principle than judicial
inertia."); Commonwealth v. Loar, 264 Pa. Super. 398, 412, 399 A.2d 1110,
1117 (1979) (abandoning orthodox rule in favor of modern rule thereby admit-
ting a witness' prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence) (disap-
3
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quated" orthodox rule.9 Specifically, the court held that the prior in-
consistent statements of a witness who is testifying in court, and is thus
available for cross-examination, may be used as substantive evidence to
prove the truth of the matters asserted. 10
This Note will initially discuss the approaches taken by the federal
government in dealing with this issue. Next, this Note will examine the
Brady decision and its anticipated ramifications, as well as the ap-
proaches taken by other jurisdictions. Finally, this Note will recommend
that the Brady rule be limited in order to ensure the reliability of state-
ments offered for their substantive value. The Note will suggest ways of
guaranteeing reliability without unduly restricting the use of certain
prior inconsistent statements.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Confrontation Clause
Since both the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause of the
United States Constitution'' protect similar interests, 12 modification of
a state's hearsay rules to admit a witness' prior inconsistent statements
as substantive evidence may implicate a criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.1 3 In California
v. Green, 14 for example, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the
proved in Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 39 n.2, 444 A.2d 653, 656 n.2(1982)). For a full discussion of Loar, see infra note 54.
9. 510 Pa. at 130-31, 507 A.2d at 70.
10. Id.
11. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). The Court noted that
the confrontation clause evolved from the need to afford criminal defendants
the opportunity to face their accusers in front of the fact-finder, and thus avoid
trying defendants on evidence consisting solely of ex parte affidavits and the like.
Id. at 156. In addition, the Court reasoned that the confrontation clause was
drafted to ensure that witnesses give their evidence under oath and subject to
cross-examination in full view of the jury. Id. at 158. Though the Green Court
acknowledged these similarities, it also noted that the hearsay rule and confron-
tation clause do not overlap to such an extent that the confrontation clause is
merely a constitutional codification of the hearsay rule. Id. at 155. Rather, the
Court stated that where the declarant of the out-of-court statement is present in
court, the protections sought to be obtained under the confrontation clause are
generally secured. Id. at 158. For a further discussion of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Green, see infra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
13. 399 U.S. at 157. The Green Court stated that any modification of the
hearsay rule to admit evidence against a criminal defendant "will often raise
questions of compatibility with the defendant's constitutional right to confronta-
tion." Id. at 156. The Court further stated that "[s]uch questions require atten-
tion to the reasons for, and the basic scope of ... the Confrontation Clause." Id.
14. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
4
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substantive admissibility of a non-party witness' prior inconsistent state-
ments in terms of their effect on a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right of confrontation. 15 In Green, respondent was convicted of furnish-
ing marijuana to a minor. 16 The conviction was based largely on evi-
dence consisting of two prior inconsistent statements made by Melvin
Porter, a sixteen-year-old minor who had been arrested for selling mari-
juana to an undercover policeman. 17 While in police custody, Porter
allegedly told a policeman that respondent had called, asked him to sell
some "stuff" and had personally delivered the marijuana which Porter
later tried to sell. 18
At respondent's preliminary hearing, Porter testified that respon-
dent was his supplier, 19 but departed from his earlier statement by testi-
fying that respondent merely showed him where to pick up the
marijuana and had not personally delivered it to him.20 While testifying
15. Id. at 155. The issue in Green was whether a California evidence statute,
which removes a witness' prior inconsistent statements from the hearsay rule
and thus provides for their substantive admissibility, was inconsistent with the
requirements of the sixth amendment confrontation clause. Id. The California
statute provided:
Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by
the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the
hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770 [requiring either
that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the state-
ment or that the witness has not been excused from giving further testi-
mony in the action].
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966 & West Compact ed. 1986).
It should be noted that sixth amendment concerns are not relevant to civil
cases because the sixth amendment specifically states that it is a right "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Green, 399 U.S. at 151.
17. Id. at 152. Porter made the first statement while in custody and the
second while testifying at respondent's preliminary hearing. Id. at 151. Both
statements named respondent as Porter's supplier, but contained different ac-
counts of the circumstances surrounding the delivery of the marijuana. Id. For a
detailed description of the witness' prior statements, see infra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text.
18. 399 U.S. at 151. Porter made this statement four days after he had been
arrested for selling marijuana to an undercover policeman. Id. Because the
statement was not recorded or reduced to a written document, its substance de-
pended entirely on the testimony of the police officer who was present at the
time Porter gave his story. Id. at 152. Nevertheless, under California Evidence
Code § 1235, the statement was admitted for substantive use at respondent's
trial. Id. For the provisions of California Evidence Code § 1235, see supra note
15.
19. 399 U.S. at 151. The preliminary hearing in which this testimony was
heard took place one week after Porter had made his initial statement to police.
Id.
20. Id. According to Porter, respondent had hidden 29 "baggies" of mari-
juana in some bushes at his parents' home. Id. Though the Court noted that
Porter was subjected to "extensive cross-examination" about his testimony, no
reason was given for the discrepancy between the testimony and his previous
statement to police. Id.
5
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at respondent's trial, 2 ' Porter admitted obtaining the marijuana shortly
after a phone call from respondent, but said he could not remember
how he obtained it.
2 2
Later in the trial, however, both of Porter's prior statements were
admitted for their substantive value 23 pursuant to California Evidence
Code section 1235.24 The statements then became the basis for respon-
dent's conviction. 25 The District Court of Appeals reversed the convic-
tion on the ground that California Evidence Code section 1235
unconstitutionally denied respondent his right of confrontation.2 6 The
21. Id. Respondent's case was tried without a jury, two months after the
preliminary hearing. Id. Porter was the State's main witness. Id. The California
Supreme Court noted that Porter was "markedly evasive and uncooperative"
while testifying. Id. at 151-52.
22. Id. at 152. Though Porter admitted that he had received a phone call
from respondent shortly before he obtained the marijuana, he testified only that
respondent had asked him to sell some unidentified "stuff." Id. Porter testified
that he could not remember the events in question because he had taken LSD
twenty minutes prior to respondent's telephone call and thus could not distin-
guish fact from fantasy. Id.
23. Id. Portions of Porter's testimony from respondent's preliminary hear-
ing were read into evidence during direct examination. Id. After these excerpts
were read, Porter said that he guessed he had gotten the marijuana from the
bushes at respondent's parents' home, though on cross-examination, he admit-
ted that he only remembered his testimony from the preliminary hearing and
not the actual events as they occurred. Id. Porter's initial statement was later
introduced via testimony by the police officer who was present when Porter was
originally questioned about respondent's role in the crime. Id. Under Califor-
nia Evidence Code § 1235, the substance of this statement was admissible as
evidence of the matters asserted therein. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966
and West Compact ed. 1986). For the provisions of California Evidence Code
§ 1235, see supra note 15. Porter admitted making both the original statement
to police and the subsequent statement at respondent's preliminary hearing.
Green, 399 U.S. at 152. He also stated that in both cases, he had been telling the
truth as he then believed it. Id.
24. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966 and West Compact ed. 1986). This
rule of evidence provides that a witness' prior inconsistent statements are not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule so long as the witness is given the oppor-
tunity to explain or deny the prior statement during the proceeding in which he
or she is testifying. Id. For the text of California Evidence Code § 1235, see
supra note 15.
25. Green, 399 U.S. at 153.
26. Id. This decision was based on California Supreme Court precedent
which held that California Evidence Code § 1235 denied criminal defendants
their right of confrontation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution. Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 68 Cal. Rptr.
599, 441 P.2d 111 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969)). In John-
son, defendant was convicted of incest on the basis of prior statements made by
his wife and daughter at a grand jury hearing. 68 Cal. 2d at 648, 68 Cal. Rptr. at
601, 441 P.2d at 113. The Supreme Court of California held that a defendant's
ability to cross-examine the witnesses against him contemporaneously with their
direct testimony is basic to the sixth amendment right of confrontation. Id. at
660, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 608, 441 P.2d at 120. According to the Johnson court,
California Evidence Code § 1235 defeated this principle and was thus unconsti-
tutional. Id.
476 [Vol. 32: p. 471
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California Supreme Court affirmed this decision.2 7
The United States Supreme Court, however, vacated the California
court's decision and held that the confrontation clause does not require
the exclusion of a witness' prior statements where the witness "concedes
making the statements, and . . . may be asked to defend or otherwise
explain the inconsistency [between the statements]." '2 8 As to the relia-
bility of the witness' prior statements, the Court stated that "[i]f the wit-
ness admits [having made] the prior statement . . . or if there is other
evidence to show the statement is his, the danger of faulty reproduction
is negligible and the jury can be confident that it has before it two con-
flicting statements by the same witness."' 29 The Court emphasized that
27. Green, 399 U.S. at 153. The California Supreme Court was "impelled by
recent decisions to find § 1235 unconstitutional." Id.
28. Id. at 164. In fact, Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that
"there is little difference as far as the Constitution is concerned between permit-
ting prior inconsistent statements to be used only for impeachment purposes,
and permitting them to be used for substantive purposes as well." Id. In terms
of the confrontation clause, the Court noted that there was no precedential bar
to substantive admissibility of a witness' prior inconsistent statements. Id. at
161. The Court stated that the concern in other decisions was the use of such
statements where the declarant is not available for cross-examination at trial. Id.
In the case of California Evidence Code § 1235, the Court stated that confronta-
tion objections have been mainly directed at the failure to allow the defendant to
confront his witnesses at trial. Id. at 157. In this regard, the Court discerned
that there is no confrontation problem in "receiving a witness' out-of-court dep-
ositions or statements, so long as the witness ... [is] present at trial to repeat his
story and to explain or repudiate any conflicting prior stories before the trier of
fact." Id. In supporting this holding, the Court stressed the importance of thor-
ough subsequent cross-examination regarding the witness' prior statement:
[T]he inability to cross-examine the witness at the time he made his
prior statement cannot easily be shown to be of crucial significance as
long as the defendant is assured of full and effective cross-examination
at the time of trial. The most successful cross-examination at the time
the prior statement was made could hardly hope to accomplish more
than has already been accomplished by the fact that the witness is now
telling a different, inconsistent story ....
Id. at 159.
As to the fact-finder's opportunity to observe the witness, the Green Court
noted:
The jury is alerted by the inconsistency in [a witness'] stories, and its
attention is sharply focused on determining either that one of the sto-
ries reflects the truth or that the witness who has apparently lied once is
believing either story. The defendant's confrontation rights are not
violated, even though some demeanor evidence that would have been
relevant in resolving this credibility issue is forever lost.
Id. at 160.
29. Id. at 158. The Court refused to address the issue of whether the wit-
ness' apparent lapse of memory as to the events in question substantially im-
paired respondent's right to cross-examination. Id. at 168-69. The Court noted
that the Supreme Court of California had not addressed the issue since that
court posited that inconsistent statements were not admissible as substantive
evidence regardless of the factual situation. Id. However, the Court concluded
that, given its general holding that substantive admissibility of a witness' prior
inconsistent statements does not violate the confrontation clause, admission of
1987] 477NOTE
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subsequent cross-examination 3 ° at trial with respect to both a witness'
past and present statements is "adequate to make equally admissible, as
far as the Confrontation Clause is concerned, both the casual, off-hand




B. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A)
Several years after the Supreme Court's decision in Green, Congress
passed Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A).32 This rule provides for
substantive admissibility of a witness' prior inconsistent statements so
long as the declarant testifies in court and is subject to cross-examina-
tion. 33 Moreover, the rule further requires that the prior statement be
given "under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or
other proceeding, or in a deposition." 34
the witness' statements despite a claimed lack of memory poses only a harmless
error question which would be better resolved by the state court. Id. at 170.
30. Id. at 159. The Court noted that the lack of contemporaneous cross-
examination is insignificant so long as the witness is subject to "full and effec-
tive" cross-examination at trial. Id. The Court further noted that the defendant
will not be "hampered in effectively attacking the prior statement, solely because
his attack comes later in time," especially where the witness' in-court testimony
favors the defense, since the witness will often be eager to explain away the prior
statement. Id. at 160.
31. Id. at 168. But see McCormick, Turncoat Witness, supra note 5, at 588 (haz-
ard in such rule of error or falsity in relating oral words-"memory of a witness
for words spoken in his presence by another is peculiarly faulty and fleeting."
Chance of error lessened where statements are written, recorded, or admitted to
by declarant).
The Green Court ruled that Porter's initial statement to the police was
equally admissible for its substantive value as was his testimony from respon-
dent's preliminary hearing. 399 U.S. at 168.
32. The current version of this rule was enacted in 1975, five years after the
Supreme Court's decision in Green. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l)(A)
provides:
A statement is not hearsay if [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hear-
ing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under
oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding, or in a deposition.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
33. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). For the text of this rule, see supra note 32.
34. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A). The rule is the result of a compromise be-
tween the House and Senate Conference Committees, each of which advocated
different formulations of the rule now in force. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7098,
7104. The House advocated allowing only those statements made "while the
declarant was subject to cross-examination at a trail [sic] or hearing or in a depo-
sition, to be admissible for their truth." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7086-87. The Sen-
ate advocated a rule similar to the Supreme Court's decision in Green. S. REP.
No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 7051, 7063. The Senate noted that requiring prior statements to be made
8
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Although the Advisory Committee expressed the view that it was
unwilling to authorize blanket admissibility of a witness' prior inconsis-
tent statements, it nonetheless recognized that certain circumstances
warranted substantive admissibility.3 5 Accordingly, it formulated Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) to provide "general safeguards" to
the reliability of statements sought to be admitted for substantive use. 36
Requiring that the prior statements have been made under oath is one
such safeguard. 3 7 By adopting such a requirement, Congress strived to
ensure the accuracy of the statement sought to be admitted for its sub-
stantive value.3 8 Though both the Advisory Committee and the Senate
Judiciary Committee argued that the requirement of oath is no longer a
strong assurance of reliability,3 9 the House Judiciary Committee noted
that, because the testimony is being recorded in a formal judicial pro-
under oath and subject to cross-examination was unnecessary. Id. For a general
discussion of the legislaive history of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l)(A), see
Comment, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Conflict Between State and Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1495, 1503-05 (1983).
35. FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee
noted that substantive admissibility is warranted in situations where the prior
statement was made under oath and the declarant testifies in court, subject to
cross-examination. Id.
36. Id. For a discussion of the safeguards to reliability provided by Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l)(A), see infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
37. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7087 (in context of House version of pro-
posed rule). Rule 801(d)(1)(A) also requires that the prior statement be made
while the declarant was subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, other
proceeding or in a deposition. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). The House noted
that requiring the prior statement to be made in the context of a formal pro-
ceeding resolves any dispute as to whether the prior statement was made and
provides "additional assurances of the reliability of the prior statement." H.R.
REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 7075, 7087; see also Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for Im-
peachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of
Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613 and 607, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1565, 1582
(1977) (Congress chose to limit substantive admissibility to situations in which
"likelihood of total fabrication was practically non-existent and the risk of subtle
influence, coercion, or deception was significantly reduced"); Ordover, Rules
Analysis, supra note 3, at 74 (federal rule adopted in response to several fears,
including increased pressure to obtain more pretrial statements and possibility
of trials conducted with use of carefully drafted statements prepared in counsels'
office); Comment, supra note 34, at 1505 ("To insure the reliability of the prior
statement, the rule now requires that a statement be 'given under oath subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition.' ").
39. See FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Com-
mittee stated that the oath "receives much less emphasis than cross-examination
as a truth-compelling device," and that only one of the many exceptions to the
hearsay rule requires a statement to be made under oath. Id. The Senate Judici-
ary Committee noted that a witness, when qualifying or denying a prior state-
ment, is doing so under oath, thus diffusing the need for an oath
contemporaneous with the making of the statement. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
9
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ceeding, the fact-finder is assured that the statement was actually
made. 40 The requirement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) (A)
that the declarant be subject to cross-examination concerning the prior
statement provides a second method of safeguarding the reliability of
the prior statement.4 1 The Advisory Committee42 and other commenta-
tors4 3 have noted that cross-examination at trial better assures the relia-
bility of the prior statement than the requirement of oath. Yet, despite
such guarantees of reliability, many have argued that Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) is over-inclusive in that it allows only those state-
ments made in the context of a formal proceeding to be admitted as
substantive evidence, and thus excludes statements made under other
circumstances with similar guarantees of reliability.4 4
C. The Modern Approach to Substantive Admissibility
1. The Pennsylvania Rule: Brady and Beyond
Before the Brady decision, the law in Pennsylvania was well-settled:
a non-party witness' prior inconsistent statements could not be used as
substantive evidence to prove the matters asserted therein. 4 5 Rather,
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7051,
7062.
40. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7087 (requirement that prior statement be made
under oath, along with context of formal proceeding itself and opportunity for
cross-examination, provide "firm additional assurances of reliability"); see also
N.H. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) reporter's note (formal context of statements admis-
sible under federal rule makes declarant aware of import of statements).
41. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(A).
42. FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note (cross-examination re-
garded as better "truth-compelling device" than oath).
43. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 38, at 1569-71 (noting effectiveness of sub-
sequent cross-examination and diminishing role of oath); McCormick, Turncoat
Witness, supra note 5, at 576 (cross-examination is major protection of reliability;
oath no longer principal safeguard of reliability).
44. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Loar, 264 Pa. Super. 398, 412-13, 399 A.2d
1 110, 1117 (1979) (adopting position that requirement of oath is unnecessary;
prior inconsistent statements by witness in court who is subject to cross-exami-
nation is admissible as substantive evidence regardless of whether made under
oath); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 251, at 747 (3d ed. 1984) (fed-
eral rule practically "confine[s]" substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements to statements made in course of formal legal proceedings); Graham,
supra note 38, at 1566, 1583 (federal rule is "overly strict" and restricts state-
ments with "strong guarantees of reliability" from substantive admissibility);
Ordover, Rules Analysis, supra note 3, at 69 (Congress' "all-or-nothing" approach
does not afford courts discretion to determine reliability on case-by-case basis;
admissibility should be based on reliability as determined from surrounding cir-
cumstances rather than formality of statement).
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 38-39, 444 A.2d 653, 656
(1982) (while prior statement itself is limited to impeachment, responses by wit-
ness while being questioned about statements during cross-examination may be
considered by fact-finder as substantive evidence); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467
Pa. 123, 135-36, 354 A.2d 875, 880 (1976) (noting criticism of orthodox rule but
480 [Vol. 32: p. 471
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such statements could only be used to impeach the credibility of the
declarant. 46 In following the orthodox rule, Pennsylvania courts relied
on the hearsay rule as a basis for excluding a non-party witness' prior
inconsistent statements from substantive admissibility. 4 7 Specifically,
the Pennsylvania courts asserted that a witness' prior statements were
too unreliable to be admitted as substantive evidence 48 because the de-
clarant was not under oath, subject to contemporaneous cross-examina-
tion or in the presence of the fact-finder when the statement was
made.49
continuing to adhere to it in case where defense called witnesses to testify about
events surrounding stabbing death of gang member, knowing that witnesses had
changed their story prior to trial); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 589,
307 A.2d 245, 248 (1973) (quoting in part 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1017,
at 993) (prior statement not to be used as substantive evidence, but only to show
that witness is capable of making errors in testimony); Commonwealth v. Brady,
338 Pa. Super. 137, 140, 487 A.2d 891, 892 (1985) (citing well-settled Penn-
sylvania law precluding admission of witness' prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa. Super. 226, 234, 448
A.2d 609, 613 (1982) (prior inconsistent statements of non-party witness not
admissible as substantive evidence).
46. Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. at 38-39, 444 A.2d at 656. For a list
of Pennsylvania cases which limited the use of a witness' prior inconsistent state-
ments to impeachment, see supra note 45.
47. 510 Pa. at 128, 507 A.2d at 68-69 ("The orthodox rule deems hearsay
generally, and prior inconsistent statements specifically, too unreliable to be ad-
mitted as substantive evidence .... "); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa.
123, 135-36, 354 A.2d 875, 880 (1976) (prior inconsistent statements are hear-
say and thus not admissible as substantive evidence; only admissible to impeach
creatibility of in-court testimony); Dincher v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 Pa.
151, 156, 51 A.2d 710, 713 (1947) (evidence of witness' prior inconsistent state-
ment that defendant came running at him with butcher knife inadmissible as
substantive evidence because made in violation of hearsay rule). Contra Com-
monwealth v. Loar, 264 Pa. Super. 398, 411-13, 399 A.2d 1110, 1117 (1979)
(better view is that witness' prior inconsistent statements are admissible as sub-
stantive evidence where witness is in court subject to cross-examination).
48. See, e.g., Brady, 510 Pa. at 128, 507 A.2d at 68-69. For a further discus-
sion of the hearsay rationale for the orthodox rule, see infra note 49 and accom-
panying text.
49. 510 Pa. at 128, 507 A.2d at 68-69. A considered argument in favor of
the orthodox rule was advocated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. See State
v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939). In Saporen, a witness testified
that he had seen defendant in a particular room at a boarding house near the
end of October. Id. at 359, 285 N.W. at 899. This testimony was inconsistent
with a prior statement made by the witness to a probation officer in which the
witness said that he had seen defendant at the boarding house on November 2.
Id. at 359, 285 N.W. at 900. The lower court allowed the state to impeach the
witness with evidence of his prior statement. Id. at 359, 285 N.W. at 899. That
evidence consisted of the statement itself as well as testimony by the probation
officer who had procured the statement and the stenographer who had recorded
and transcribed it. Id. at 359, 285 N.W. at 900-01. The court noted that the
evidence presented was not confined to the inconsistency of dates, but encom-
passed declarations made by the witness which tended to inculpate defendant.
Id. at 360, 285 N.W. at 900. After stating the orthodox rule and Wigmore's
argument against it, the court reasoned: (1) the fact that the witness is currently
11
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Although Pennsylvania's rationale for adhering to the orthodox rule
was not unique, 50 the promulgation of Federal Rule of Evidence
under oath does nothing to solemnize his prior statement; (2) subsequent cross-
examination of the witness regarding the prior statement is ineffective since the
"principle virtue [of cross-examination] is in its immediate application of the
testing process. Its strokes fall while the iron is hot ... [and] [flalse testimony is
apt to harden ... as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration .... ; and
(3) use of a witness' prior inconsistent statements would increase the likelihood
that declarations resulting from undue influence and coercion would be admit-
ted as substantive evidence. Id. at 361-62, 285 N.W. at 900-01. It should be
noted that Minnesota, with the adoption of Minnesota Rule of Evidence
801(d)(l)(A), has changed its position regarding the substantive admissibility of
a non-party witness' prior inconsistent statements. See MINN. R. EvID.
801(d)(l)(A). For a discussion of current state rules, see infra notes 91-112 and
accompanying text.
See also People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111
(1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969) (analysis in terms of effect of
modern rule on sixth amendment right of confrontation); Ruhala v. Roby, 379
Mich. 102, 125, 150 N.W.2d 146, 156 (1967) ("Stale friendly cross-examination
'with respect to' a prior extra-judicial statement is no substitute for timely, ad-
versary cross-examination 'upon' a statement."); FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory
committee's note (hearsay problem arises when witness denies making state-
ment or admits making statement but denies that it was true; no hearsay prob-
lem when witness adopts the prior statement); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra
note 3, § 251, at 744 ("The logic of the orthodox view is that the [prior] state-
ment of the witness is hearsay since its value rests on the credit of the declarant,
who, when the statement was made, was not (1) under oath, (2) in the presence
of the trier [of fact], or (3) subject to cross-examination."); 3A J. WIGMORE,
supra note 6, § 1018, at 996 ("[T]he theory of the hearsay rule is that an extraju-
dicial statement is rejected because it was made out of court by an absent person
not subject to cross-examination."); Graham, supra note 38, at 1568 ("[D]enial
of substantive effect to a witness' prior inconsistent statements ... [is] based on
a threefold rationale of lack of trustworthiness: (1) the statement was not made
under oath, (2) the trier of fact did not observe the declarant's demeanor at the
time the statement was made, and (3) the declarant was not subject to contem-
poraneous cross examination .... ); McCormick, Turncoat Witness, supra note 5,
at 575 (value of statement "rests on the credit of the declarant, who was not
under oath nor subject to cross-examination, when the statement was made");
Morgan, supra note 6, at 192 ("The courts declare the prior statement to be
hearsay because it was not made under oath, subject to the penalty for perjury or
to the test of cross examination."); Comment, supra note 34, at 1497 (no indica-
tion that prior statement is reliable when declarant is not subject to cross-
examination).
50. See, e.g., State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 749, 513 A.2d 86, 90 (1986)
(prior inconsistent statements not admissible under orthodox rule because de-
clarant not under oath, in presence of fact-finder or subject to cross-examina-
tion); State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 361-62, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939)
(absence of oath and opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination make
prior inconsistent statements inadmissible under hearsay rule); Brady, 510 Pa. at
128, 507 A.2d at 68-69 (prior inconsistent statements too unreliable to be admit-
ted as substantive evidence under orthodox rule because declarant not under
oath, subject to cross-examination or in presence of fact-finder when statement




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss2/4
1987] NOTE 483
801(d)(1)(A), 5 1 criticism by legal commentators 52 and abandonment of
the orthodox rule by other jurisdictions 5 3 prompted some members of
the Pennsylvania judiciary to re-examine the commonwealth's position
regarding the substantive admissibility of a witness' prior inconsistent
statements. 5 4 Despite growing doubt and inquiry concerning the con-
tinued efficacy of adhering to the orthodox rule, Pennsylvania courts did
51. For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l)(A), see supra note
32.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first took note of the rule in Commonwealth
v. Gee, stating that the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1)(A) served
as yet another example of the criticism waged upon the orthodox rule by courts
and legal commentators alike. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 136 n.5, 354 A.2d 875, 880 n.5
(1976).
For a further discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (A), see supra
notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of commentators who have criticized the orthodox
rule, see supra note 6. For a further discussion of the orthodox rule in terms of
the particular benefits afforded by substantive admissibility of a witness' prior
inconsistent statements, see infra notes 65-68, 71 and accompanying text.
53. See Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 145, 354 A.2d 875, 885 (1976)
(Roberts, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion in Gee, Justice Roberts noted
that many jurisdictions had broken from the orthodox rule and adopted a more
modern rule allowing for substantive admissibility of a witness' prior inconsis-
tent statements. Id. Justice McDermott, dissenting in Commonwealth v. Thirkield,
also noted that many other jurisdictions had discarded the orthodox rule. Com-
monwealth v. Thirkield, 502 Pa. 542, 543, 467 A.2d 323, 324 (1983) (per
curiam) (McDermott, J., dissenting). Justice McDermott cited these authorities
in urging the court to address the issue and adopt the modern rule. Id. at 543
n. 1, 467 A.2d at 324 n. 1 (per curiam) (McDermott, J., dissenting). Similarly, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court noted the trend toward substantive admissibility in
Commonwealth v. Loar, 264 Pa. Super. 398, 411-12, 399 A.2d 1110, 1117
(1979). For a full discussion of Loar, see infra note 54.
54. See Commonwealth v. Thirkield, 502 Pa. 542, 543, 467 A.2d 323, 324
(1983) (per curiam) (McDermott, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa.
123, 143, 354 A.2d 875, 884 (1976) (RobertsJ., dissenting); Commonwealth v.
Loar, 264 Pa. Super. 398, 411-12, 399 A.2d 1110, 1117 (1979).
In Commonwealth v. Loar, the Pennsylvania Superior Court tried to abolish
the orthodox rule in favor of a more liberal one, though the court's decision to
allow substantive admissibility of a witness' prior inconsistent statements was
later rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Wal-
ler, 498 Pa. 33, 39 n.2, 444 A.2d 653, 656 n.2 (1982) (substantive admissibility
of prior inconsistent statements "has never been and is not now the law in this
Commonwealth"). In Loar, a witness who had been implicated in a number of
thefts made a statement which linked appellant to those same thefts. 264 Pa.
Super. at 406, 399 A.2d at 1114. When called to testify at appellant's prelimi-
nary hearing, the witness denied that appellant had been involved in the thefts.
Id. At the Commonwealth's request, the witness then read his prior statement to
the court. Id. at 406-07, 399 A.2d at 1114-15. This statement was admitted as
substantive evidence despite an attempt by appellant's counsel to limit its use to
impeachment. Id. at 407, 399 A.2d at 1115. Although the magistrate presiding
over the preliminary hearing allowed the statement to be used as substantive
evidence, there is nothing in the published opinion setting forth the magistrate's
reason for doing so. Id. The Loar court upheld the substantive use of the wit-
ness' prior statement. Id. at 413, 399 A.2d at 1118. The rationale underlying
the superior court's decision was similar to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
13
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not abandon it until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Brady.5
5
In Brady,5 6 the court held that the "otherwise admissible prior in-
consistent statements of a [non-party] declarant who is a witness in a
judicial proceeding and is available for cross-examination may be used
as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted
therein."
57
The appellee in Brady was being tried for the murder of a security
guard at a manufacturing plant. 58 Several hours after the murder, ap-
pellee's girlfriend, Tina Traxler, gave a tape-recorded statement to po-
lice detailing the events surrounding the security guard's death.5 9 In
that statement, Traxler said that appellee had stabbed the security guard
after he had discovered appellee attempting to pry open a change
machine.
60
reasoning in Brady. For a full discussion of Brady, see infra notes 56-77 and ac-
companying text.
Under the Loar decision, a witness' prior inconsistent statements are admis-
sible as substantive evidence so long as the witness is in court and subject to
cross-examination. Id. at 412, 399 A.2d at 1117. The court adopted this partic-
ular approach to substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements after
an analysis of California Evidence Code § 1235. Id. at 411-12, 399 A.2d at 1117-
18. California Evidence Code § 1235 was at issue in California v. Green, and fig-
ured in the development of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l)(A). See Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (A) advisory committee's note. For
a full discussion of Green, see supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text. For a
full discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l) (A), see supra notes 32-44
and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Floyd, 508 Pa. 393, 399, 498 A.2d 816, 819
(1985) (murder conviction set aside because prior inconsistent identification ad-
mitted as substantive evidence); Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 38-39
n.2, 444 A.2d 653, 656 n.2 (rejecting superior court decision in Loar and reem-
phasizing orthodox rule as applicable Pennsylvania law).
56. 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986). Justice Larsen wrote the majority
opinion. Id. at 125, 507 A.2d at 66. ChiefJustice Nix concurred in the decision,
while Justices Flaherty and Zappala dissented. Id. at 135, 507 A.2d at 72.
57. Id. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70. This is the same position taken by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Loar. For a discussion of Loar, see
supra note 54.
58. 510 Pa. at 125, 507 A.2d at 67. Evidence introduced at trial disclosed
that appellee ran his car into a ditch on a dirt road. Id. While walking back to
town, appellee and his girlfriend came to the manufacturing plant and entered it
through a side door. Id.
59. Id. at 126, 507 A.2d at 67. The court noted that both the witness'
mother and her attorney were present when she gave her statement to the po-
lice. Id. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70. The Brady court also noted that "[t]he attorney
questioned both Traxler and her mother to assure that the statement was being
given knowingly, voluntarily and with understanding of her rights and options."
Id. at 131-32, 507 A.2d at 70. Two days after giving this statement to the police,
Traxler repeated essentially the same account of the events leading up to the
stabbing death of the security guard,' though the court's opinion does not state
in what context the story was repeated. Id. at 132, 507 A.2d at 70.
60. Id. at 125-26, 507 A.2d at 67.
[Vol. 32: p. 471
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Prior to trial, Traxler recanted the statement, denying that she and
appellee had ever entered the manufacturing plant.6 1 After Traxler re-
peated the recanted version of her story at appellee's trial, the court
allowed the Commonwealth to cross-examine her and introduce the
prior tape-recorded statement as substantive evidence. 62 The superior
court reversed, holding that the tape-recorded statement was not admis-
sible under existing precedent. 63
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the superior court and
adopted the trial court's decision to admit Traxler's prior inconsistent
statement as substantive evidence. 64 In discarding the orthodox rule,
the court stated that there are virtually no hearsay concerns presented
by the substantive admissibility of a witness' prior inconsistent state-
ments when that witness testifies at trial. 65 The court reasoned that
hearsay concerns are absent because the declarant is now present in
court testifying under oath, subject to cross-examination and under the
scrutiny of the fact-finder. 66
61. Id. at 132, 507 A.2d at 70. Traxler stated that she and appellee had
walked past the plant on their way to a friend's home but had never gone inside.
Id. Rather, Traxler said that she and appellee went directly to the friend's home
where they stayed until the following morning. Id. at 132, 507 A.2d at 70-7 1.
62. Id. When questioned about the discrepancy in her stories, Traxler
stated that she was afraid of the police and, as a result, had told them what they
wanted to hear. Id. at 132, 507 A.2d at 71.
63. Id. at 126, 507 A.2d at 68. The only rationale offered by the Superior
Court in support of its decision was that substantive admissibility of a non-party
witness' prior inconsistent statements ran contrary to longstanding Pennsylvania
law. Commonwealth v. Brady, 338 Pa. Super. 137, 140, 487 A.2d 891, 892
(1985) (quoting Commonwealth v. McGuire, 302 Pa. Super. 226, 234, 448 A.2d
609, 613 (1982)).
64. Id. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71. The majority stated, "We accept th[e] [trial]
court's invitation to hold that the tape-recorded statement was properly admit-
ted as substantive evidence." Id.
In a concurring opinion, ChiefJustice Nix expressed concern over the "ju-
risprudential precedent" being set by the case. Id. at 135, 507 A.2d at 72 (Nix,
C.J., concurring). ChiefJustice Nix criticized the trial court for not following the
clear mandate of Pennsylvania law at that time. Id. (Nix, C.J., concurring). The
proper approach, he wrote, would be to exclude the evidence and let the Com-
monwealth appeal. Id. at 136, 507 A.2d at 72-73 (Nix, C.J., concurring).
65. Id. at 128, 507 A.2d at 69 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155 (1970)). This is the position taken by such proponents of the modern rule
as Professors McCormick, Morgan, and Wigmore, as well as courts in other ju-
risdictions that have adopted the modern rule. See generally C. McCoRMICK, Evi-
DENCE, supra note 3, § 251; 3AJ. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1018; McCormick,
Turncoat Witness, supra note 5, at 573; Morgan, supra note 6, at 177. For a discus-
sion of other jurisdictions that have adopted some version of the modern rule,
see infra notes 91, 93-112 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
the effect of the modern rule on hearsay concerns, see infra notes 66-68, 71 and
accompanying text.
66. Brady, 510 Pa. at 129, 507 A.2d at 69. Several courts and commentators
have suggested that the oath is no longer a valid means of assuring the trustwor-
thiness of a witness' testimony. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's
note ("[T]he oath ... receives much less emphasis than cross-examination as a
1987] NOTE
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Addressing the concern that subsequent cross-examination of the
declaration is not sufficient to ensure the reliability of his or her prior
statement, the Brady court reasoned that such subsequent cross-exami-
nation is likely to be "meaningful and vigorous." 6 7 The court further
reasoned that the fact-finder will have the opportunity to observe the
witness, "bring[ing] to bear his or her sensory observations, experience,
common sense and logic . . . to assess [the witness']. credibility and to
determine the truth and accuracy of both the out-of-court declarations
and the in-court testimony."'68 The court noted that counsel for both
parties questioned Traxler extensively about the inconsistencies in her
stories. 6 9 As a result, the court concluded that the fact-finder had ample
opportunity to observe Traxler's demeanor while she was on the
stand. 70 In addition, the Brady court noted that a witness' prior state-
ments often possess superior indicia of reliability because they were
made closer in time to the event they describe and, as a result, are less
truth-compelling device."); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 251, at
744 ("The oath is on longer a principal safeguard of the trustworthiness of testi-
mony."). However, the United States Supreme Court, in Green, noted that be-
cause the witness is now under oath, he must "affirm, deny, or qualify the truth
of the prior statement under the penalty of perjury [and that] the very fact that
the prior statement was not given under [oath] may become the witness' expla-
nation for its inaccuracy." 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970). It should be noted that the
Brady court did not specifically address the validity of the oath in its opinion. See
510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986).
67. 510 Pa. at 129, 507 A.2d at 69. The court noted that subsequent cross-
examination puts the witness "on the spot," requiring him to explain the dis-
crepancies between his in-court testimony and prior statements, or to deny that
he ever made the prior statements. Id.
68. Id. This portion of the Brady court's rationale is similar to that es-
poused by Judge Learned Hand. See DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d
Cir. 1925) (witness testified at grand jury hearing that defendants were responsi-
ble for attack on State's witness; at trial, witness testified that she could no
longer testify as she had at grand jury hearing). As to the fact-finder's opportu-
nity to observe the witness' demeanor, Judge Hand stated:
The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the earlier state-
ments in preference to those made upon the stand is indeed real, but
we find no difficulty in it. If, from all that the jury see of the witness,
they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said
before, they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of
that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity that the case
must be decided only in accordance with the truth of words uttered
under oath in court.
Id. at 368.
69. 510 Pa. at 132, 507 A.2d at 71. The court noted that Traxler was also
questiond about the validity of each statement, and that her entire testimony
comprised 200 pages of the trial transcript. Id. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71. The
court also noted that the out-of-court declarations were rendered under circum-
stances which assured that they were "voluntary, knowing and understanding."
Id. Specifically, the court noted that both Traxler's mother and her attorney had
been present when the statement was made. Id. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70.
70. Id. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71. The court noted that "the jury had more
than adequate opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor, hear her testi-
mony and explanations and assess her credibility." Id.
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susceptible to fabrication, coercion or external influence. 7 1
From its examination of the surrounding circumstances, the court
concluded that continued adherence to the orthodox rule would do sig-
nificant damage to the integrity of the fact-finding process and keep rel-
evant information from the jury.72
In rejecting the traditional rule, however, the Brady court empha-
sized that Traxler's statements were "rendered under highly reliable cir-
cumstances assuring that they were voluntary, knowing and
understanding." '7 3 Thus, although the Brady court's holding requires
only that the witness testify in court subject to cross-examination con-
cerning the prior statement,7 4 the decision implies that the court will
examine the reliability of the statements before admitting them as sub-
stantive evidence. 75
In dissent, Justice Flaherty and Justice Zappala were concerned that
the prior statements may not be adequately presented and explained in
the subsequent legal proceeding, where they are being offered for their
substantive value. 76 The Justices stated that such concerns also raise
questions as to the value and trustworthiness of the statements, espe-
cially where they are sought as the sole proof of guilt in criminal cases. 77
71. Id. at 130, 507 A.2d at 69; see also FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory commit-
tee's note (inconsistent statement more likely to be true because made nearer in
time to actual event and less likely to be influenced by circumstances of contro-
versy); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 251, at 745 ("An additional
persuasive factor against the orthodox rule is the superior trustworthiness of
earlier statements, on the basis that memory hinges on recency.").
72. 510 Pa. at 130-31, 507 A.2d at 70. The Brady court, quoting Justice
Roberts' dissent in Commonwealth v. Gee, noted that "[a]n evidentiary rule which
forces the searcher to ignore relevant clues whose reliability can be tested by
cross-examination serves no purpose." Id. (quoting Gee, 467 Pa. at 146, 354
A.2d at 886 (Roberts, J., dissenting)).
73. Id. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71. For a description of the circumstances under
which Traxler testified, see supra notes 69-70.
74. 510 Pa. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70. The court seemed to suggest that at
least one factor in determining the reliability of an out-of-court statement is
whether it was "voluntary, knowing and understanding." Id. The Brady court
also noted that Traxler's prior statement was corroborated by other evidence in
the case. Id. at 126 n.1, 507 A.2d at 67 n.l. Thus, corroboration could also be a
factor for Pennsylvania courts to consider in determining whether a witness'
prior inconsistent statements possess sufficient indicia of reliability to be admis-
sible as substantive evidence. For a discussion of corroboration in the context of
prior inconsistent statements, see infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
75. See 510 Pa. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70.
76. Id. at 136-37, 507 A.2d at 73 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Justice Flaherty
argued that the Commonwealth must prove each element of a crime with evi-
dence presented during the actual trial and not with evidence consisting of prior
out-of-court statements. Id. at 137, 507 A.2d at 73 (Flaherty,J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Justice Flaherty argued that the modern
rule as announced by the Brady majority works to "bootstrap" the guilt of the
accused. Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting); see also Comment, supra note 34, at 1496
(substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is of particular con-
cern in criminal trials; determination of weight to be given such statements re-
1987] NOTE
17
Hilliard: Substantive Admissibility of a Non-Party Witness' Prior Inconsist
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987
ViLLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32: p. 471
The Pennsylvania courts have applied the Brady rule in only one
subsequent decision.7 8 In Wilson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Penn-
sylvania Board of Probation and Parole,7 9 petitioner was charged with violat-
ing the provisions of his parole agreement. 80  While on parole,
petitioner was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and related
offenses. 8 1 At petitioner's parole violation hearing, the alleged victim,
who had initiated the original assault charges, testified that petitioner
never struck her.8 2 This testimony was contrary to a prior statement
given at petitioner's preliminary hearing.8 3 The Board examiner subse-
quently relied on the victim's prior recorded statements rather than on
her live testimony in finding that petitioner had violated his parole
agreement. 8 4 Petitioner charged that the examiner's decision was based
solely on improperly admitted hearsay and that, if the victim's prior
statements were stricken, the record would contain no evidence to sup-
port the revocation.8 5 After examining the supreme court's decision in
Brady, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court determined that, "the re-
quires consideration of two competing policies-trustworthiness of prior
statements and need for evidence).
Concern over the trustworthiness and reliability of a witness' prior inconsis-
tent statements was also expressed by the Advisory Committee on Federal Rule
of Evidence 801 and the United States Supreme Court in Green. For a discussion
of Federal Rule of Evidence 801, see supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of Green, see supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
78. See Wilson v. Commonwealth of Pa., Pa. Board of Probation and Parole,
97 Pa. Commw. 202, 509 A.2d 1335 (1986). Additionally, in Commonwealth v.
Gioan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated a Superior Court decision and
remanded the case to that court for reconsideration in light of the Brady deci-
sion. Gioan, 511 Pa. 342, 342-43, 513 A.2d 983, 983 (1986) (per curiam).
79. Wilson, 97 Pa. Commw. 202, 509 A.2d 1335 (1986).
80. Id. at 203, 509 A.2d at 1335-36. Petitioner had already been recommit-
ted as a technical parole violator by a decision of the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole. Id. Wilson was an appeal of that decision. Id. at 203, 509
A.2d at 1336.
81. Id. at 203, 509 A.2d at 1336. Those related crimes consisted of simple
assault, recklessly endangering another person and possession of an instrument
of crime. Id. At the time these offenses were committed, petitioner was on pa-
role from a one-to-five-year sentence for theft, assault, and possession of an in-
strument of crime. Id.
82. Id. Petitioner had beaten the victim, his paramour at the time of the
incident, with a four-foot tree branch. Id. The beating apparently occurred in
response to a fight between the victim and another woman concerning the other
woman's involvement with petitioner. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. These statements were in the form of notes from the victim's testi-
mony at petitioner's preliminary hearing and were introduced after the parole
agent pleaded surprise. Id. at 204, 509 A.2d at 1336. The statements were then
admitted as substantive evidence over the objection of petitioner's counsel. Id.
85. Id. The court noted that while hearsay evidence was admissible in pa-
role revocation hearings, a recommitment order could not be based solely on
improperly admitted hearsay. Id. Thus, the court reasoned that it had to accept
the prior recorded testimony as direct, substantive evidence in order to base its
recommitment order on such evidence. Id.
488
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liability factors cited in Brady are equally applicable to an administrative
proceeding before [a] parole Board .... ,,86 From this the court con-
cluded that the victim's prior recorded testimony was not hearsay and
was, therefore, competent evidence on which to base a recommitment
order.8
7
2. Substantive Admissibility in Other States
Although Pennsylvania only recently rejected the orthodox rule, 88
the Brady decision and its supporting rationale are not unique. 8 9 Rely-
ing primarily on the same rationale as that employed in Brady,90 forty-
one states have elected to follow some version of the modern rule, and
thus allow the admission of a non-party witness' prior inconsistent state-
ments as substantive evidence.9 ' Only eight states and the District of
86. Id. at 206, 509 A.2d at 1336-37 (citing reasoning employed by Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Brady, both in discarding orthodox rule and institut-
ing modern rule as Pennsylvania law). For a full discussion of Brady, see supra
notes 56-77 and accompanying text.
87. Wilson, 97 Pa. Commw. at 206, 509 A.2d at 1337.
88. Five months after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Brady,
the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the orthodox rule, citing the Brady de-
cision as a factor in its decision. See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d
86 (1986). For a discussion of Whelan, see infra notes 101, 105-07, 111-12 and
accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 750, 513 A.2d 86, 91 (1986)
(subsequent cross-examination is sufficient and meaningful; jury able to observe
witness in court and thus able to decide which statement to believe, and prior
statements may be more reliable than in-court testimony because made closer in
time to event they describe and are thus less subject to failure of memory and
false suggestion); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 863, 286 S.E.2d 717, 721
(1982) (oath is no longer strong guarantee of reliability; prior statements often
more reliable because made closer in time to event they describe, and require-
ments that jury observe declarant and that defendant have opportunity for cross-
examination are satisfied where declarant testifies subject to cross-examination
at trial); Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d 423, 426-27 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc) (prior statement often more accurate and reliable than in-court testimony
because statement made when memory was fresher; cross-examination at trial
relieves most hearsay dangers, and jury able to observe declarant's demeanor at
trial). For a discussion of the rationale employed by the Brady court, see supra
notes 65-75 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Whelan, see infra notes
101, 105-07, 111-12 and accompanying text.
90. For a discussion of the rationale employed by the Brady court, see supra
notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
91. Alaska-AASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A), Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88
(Alaska 1971); Arizona-ARiz. R. EviD. 801 (d) (1) (A), State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz.
135, 515 P.2d 880 (1973); Arkansas-ARK. UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(i); Califor-
nia-CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West Compact ed. 1987), People v. Freeman, 20
Cal. App. 3d 488, 97 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1971); Colorado-CoLo. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A) (civil cases), COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-201 (1986) (criminal cases);
Connecticut-State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86 (1986); Delaware-
DEL. UNIV. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (civil cases), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3507(a)
(1979) (criminal cases); Florida-FLA. EvID. CODE 90.801(2)(a); Georgia-Gib-
bons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1983); Hawaii-HAw. R. EVID.
802.1(1); Idaho-IDAHo R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(A); Illionis-ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
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Columbia still fully adhere to the orthodox rule and refuse to admit a
para. 115-10.1 (Smith-Hurd 1986) (criminal cases only); Indiana-Watkins v.
State, 446 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1983), Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d
482 (1975); Iowa-IOWA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); Kansas-KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 60-460(a) (West Supp. 1984), State v. Lott, 207 Kan. 602, 485 P.2d 1314
(1971); Kentucky-Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1982), Jett
v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); Maine-ME. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); Massachusetts-Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 469
N.E.2d 483 (1984); Minnesota-MINN. R. EVID. 801 (d) (1) (A); Mississippi-Miss.
R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); Missouri-Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.074 (West Supp. 1987)
(criminal cases), Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc) (application of criminal rule in civil cases); Montana-MONT. R. EVID.
801(d)(l)(A); Nebraska-NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(a)(i) (1985); Nevada-
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.035(2)(a) (Michie 1986); New Hampshire-N.H. R.
EvID. 801(d)(l)(A); New Jersey-N.J. R. EvID. 63(1), State v. Provet, 133 N.J.
Super. 432, 337 A.2d 374 (1975); New Mexico-N.M. R. EvID. 11-801(D)(1)(a);
North Dakota-N.D. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(i), State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D.
1973); Ohio-OHio R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(a); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2801(4)(a)(1) (West 1980); Oregon-ORE. R. EVID. 801(4)(a)(A); Penn-
sylvania-Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986); South Car-
olina-State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103
(1982); South Dakota-S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-2(1) (Rule
801(d)(1)(A)) (1979); Texas-TEx. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(A); Utah-UTAH R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); Vermont-VT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); Washington-WASH. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(i); West Virginia-W. VA. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); Wisconsin-
Wis. R. EVID. 908.01(4)(a)(1), Vogel v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 372, 291 N.W.2d 838
(1980); Wyoming-Wvo. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); see also Annotation, Use orAdmis-
sibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements of Witness as Substantive Evidence of Facts to Which
They Relate in Criminal Case-Modern State Cases, 30 A.L.R.4th 414 (1984) (collect-
ing cases on substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements of wit-
nesses in criminal proceedings).
The State of Michigan allows prior statements of identification to be used as
substantive evidence, but follows the orthodox rule with regard to other types of
prior inconsistent statements. See MicH. R. EvID. 801(d)(1). Michigan Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1) provides: "A statement is not hearsay if [t]he declarant testi-
fies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is one of identification of a person made after per-
ceiving him." Id.
Of the 41 jurisdictions that have allowed a witness' prior statements to be
used for their substantive value, only seven have done so by judicial decisions.
See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86 (1986) (prior written state-
ments of witness to barroom brawl and stabbing admitted as substantive evi-
dence to defeat defendant's claim of self-defense); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga.
858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982) (statements of witness to effect that appellant had
murdered victim by cutting his throat and tying him to tree admitted as substan-
tive evidence so long as witness subject to cross-examination); Patterson v.
State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975) (prior written statements of defend-
ant's wife and victim's guest given to police after murder admissible as substan-
tive evidence where witnesses present and subject to cross-examination even
though statements not made under oath); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d
788 (Ky. 1969) (police testimony that defendant's wife, during an emergency
phone call to police, said defendant was taking advantage of her sister-in-law
admissible as substantive evidence when wife later testified that she said no such
thing); Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 469 N.E.2d 483 (1984) (discussed
at infra note 102 and accompanying text); Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986)
(discussed at supra notes 56-77 and accompanying text); State v. Copeland, 278
S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (police officer allowed to testify to witness' prior state-
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witness' prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. 92
Of the forty-one jurisdictions that have elected to follow the mod-
ern rule,93 twenty have adopted a rule similar to that established in
Brady, whereby a witness' prior statements are admissible so long as the
witness is subject to cross-examination during the proceeding in which
the statement is offered. 94 However, five of these twenty jurisdictions
have elected to do so only in civil cases. 95 Three of these five jurisdic-
tions have chosen to follow identical re-enactments of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) in criminal cases. 96 The other two jurisdictions,
ments that gun used in murder of three gas station attendants could be located
behind appellant's trailer so long as witness testifies at trial and subject to cross-
examination), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1982).
For further discussion of Whelan, see infra notes 101, 105-07, 111-12 and
accompanying text. For a breakdown of states in terms of the specific form of
the modern rule adopted by each, see infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
92. The following nine jurisdictions still fully adhere to the orthodox rule
which prohibits the use of a witness' prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence: Alabama-Cloud v. Moon, 290 Ala. 33, 37, 273 So. 2d 196, 200
(1973); District of Columbia-Turner v. United States, 443 A.2d 542, 549 (D.C.
1982); Louisiana-State v. Kimble, 375 So. 2d 76, 79 (La. 1979); Maryland-
Smith v. Branscome, 251 Md. 582, 590, 248 A.2d 455, 462 (1968); New York-
People v. Ramirez, 51 A.D.2d 809, 810, 380 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (1976); North Car-
olina-State v. Erby, 56 N.C. App. 358, 361, 289 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1982); Rhode
Island-State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23, 25 (R.I. 1979); Tennessee-Martin v.
State, 584 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-403 (1984). Though the State of Michigan has provided for substantive
admissibility of prior statements of identification, it has not done so with regard
to other prior statements and thus may be considered to follow the orthodox
rule in this respect. See MICH. R. EvIo. 801(d)(1). For a discussion of Michigan
Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1), see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
93. For a list of these states, see supra note 91 and accompanying text. For
a breakdown of states according to the type of modern rule followed, see infra
notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
94. Alaska-ALAsKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); Arizona-ARIz. R. EvIn.
801(d)(1)(A); Arkansas-ARK. UNIF. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(i); California-CAL.
Evmo. CODE § 1235 (West Compact ed. 1986); Colorado-CoLo. R. EViD.
801 (d) (1) (A); Delaware-DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 801 (d) (1) (A); Georgia-Gibbons v.
State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982); Indiana-Patterson v. State, 263 Ind.
55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975); Kansas-KAN. Civ. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-460(a)
(West Supp. 1984); Kentucky-Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky.
1969); Missouri-Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.074 (West Supp. 1987), Rowe v. Farm-
ers Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Montana-MONT. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); Nevada-NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.035(2)(a) (Michie 1986); New
Mexico-N.M. R. EvID. 11-801(D)(l)(a); North Dakota-N.D. R. EvID.
801(d)(1)(i); Pennsylvania-Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66
(1986); South Carolina-State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63, cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1982); Utah-UTAH R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); Wisconsin-
Wis. R. EvID. 908.01(4)(a)(1); Wyoming-Wyo. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
95. See ARK. UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(i); COLO. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); DEL.
UNIF. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); N.D. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(i); Wvo. R. EViD.
801(d)(l)(A).
96. See ARK. UNIF. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(i); N.D. R. EviD. 801(d)(l)(i); Wyo. R.
EvID. 801 (d) (1) (A). For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(l)(A), see
supra note 32.
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Colorado and Delaware, have each followed different routes in adapting
the modern rule for use in criminal cases.
97
Fourteen of the forty-one jurisdictions following the modern rule
have adopted verbatim re-enactments of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A) that are applicable to both civil and criminal proceed-
ings.98 However, while Texas courts apply a verbatim re-enactment of
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) (A) in civil cases, 99 they apply a vari-
ation of this rule in criminal cases.10 0
In an effort to ensure the reliability of a witness' prior state-
ments, 10 six states have chosen to follow some variation or extension of
either the Brady rule or Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (A). 10 2 Most
noteworthy among these variations are the rules adopted by Connecti-
97. Colorado provides that a witness' prior inconsistent statements may be
used substantively so long as the witness is given the opportunity to explain or
deny the statement or is further able to testify, and the prior statement relates to
a matter within the witness' personal knowledge. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-201
(1986).
In Delaware, the prior statement of a witness who is subject to cross-exami-
nation in a criminal prosecution may be used substantively if it was made volun-
tarily. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3507(a) (1979). Subsection (b) of the Delaware
rule states that the provision applies regardless of whether the prior statement
and the in-court testimony are consistent. Id. § 3507(b).
98. See FLA. EVID. CODE 90.801(2)(a); IDAHO R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); IOWA R.
EvID. 801(d)(1)(A); ME. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A); MINN. R. EVlD. 801(d)(1)(A);
Miss. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(a)(i) (1985); N.H. R.
EVID. 801(d)(l)(A); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2801(4)(a)(1) (West 1980); ORE.
R. EvID. 801(4)(a)(A); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-2(1) (Rule 801(d)
(1)(A)) (1979); VT. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A); WASH. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i); W. VA. R.
EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
99. TEX. R. EVlD. 801(e) (l) (A).
100. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 801(e)(1)(A). Applicable to criminal proceedings,
the Texas rule provides:
A statement is not hearsay if ... the declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement
and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, except a grand jury proceeding, or in a deposition.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 752-53, 513 A.2d 86, 91-92
(1986). The Supreme Court of Connecticut stated that admitting a witness'
prior inconsistent statements without some restriction would allow the substan-
tive use of oral statements made "in jest or to boast of knowledge of criminal
activity in which the declarant was not actually involved." d. at 753, 513 A.2d at
92. The Whelan court noted that such statements would be difficult for the de-
clarant to explain and might be determinative of the defendant's guilt. Id.; see
also HAW. R. EVID. 802.1 commentary (provisions allowing for substantive ad-
missibility of prior written statements as well as verbatim recordings secure
trustworthiness of statements as do similar provisions in federal Jencks Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3500(e)(l)-(2) (1982)). For a discussion of Hawaii Rule of Evidence
802.1(1), see infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Jencks Act, see infra note 108.
102. See HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, par. 115-10.1
(Smith-Hurd 1986); Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 469 N.E.2d 483
492 [Vol. 32: p. 471
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cut 10 3 and Hawaii. 10 4
(1984); N.J. R. EvID. 63(1); OHIo R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(a); State v. Whelan, 200
Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86 (1986).
For a discussion of the Hawaii rule, see infra notes 108-12 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of Whelan, see supra note 101 and infra notes 105-07,
111-12 and accompanying text.
The Illinois rule is applicable only to criminal cases, and provides for sub-
stantive admissibility of a witness' prior inconsistent statements when the wit-
ness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 115-10.1 (Smith-Hurd 1986). Moreover, the prior statement must
have been made under oath at a formal proceeding or involve an event to which
the testifying witness has personal knowledge. Id. In addition, if the statement
was not made at a formal proceeding, it must be written or signed by the wit-
ness, acknowledged by the witness under oath in a formal proceeding or accu-
rately recorded by an electronic means of sound recording. Id.
Having adopted its approach to the modern rule by judicial decision, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts now admits a witness' prior inconsistent state-
ment for its substantive value if it is
made under oath before a grand jury, provided the witness can be ef-
fectively cross-examined as to the accuracy of the statement, the state-
ment was not coerced and was more than a mere confirmation or denial
of an allegation by the interrogator, and other evidence tending to
prove the issue is presented.
Daye, 393 Mass. at 75, 469 N.E.2d at 495-96.
Before the court can consider the admissibility of a prior inconsistent state-
ment, counsel must first ask for a voir dire so that the witness may be reminded
of the circumstances under which the prior statement was made and be given an
opportunity to explain the inconsistency. Id. at 74 n.21, 469 N.E.2d at 495 n.21.
Only after this will the judge rule on admissibility. Id. Massachusettes will also
allow a witness' prior inconsistent statement to be admitted substantively
"[wihere there is no objection [to such use] ... and no request for a limiting
instruction." Commonwealth v. Luce, 399 Mass. 479, 482, 505 N.E.2d 178, 180
(1987) (prior inconsistent statements of defendant's brother and sister admissi-
ble for substantive use where defense counsel did not object when inconsistency
brought out).
Beyond these two applictaions of the modern rule, however, Massachusetts
courts steadfastly refuse to depart from the orthodox rule. See Commonwealth
v. Frisino, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 551, -, 488 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1986) (signed but
unsworn prior statement held inadmissible for substantive use); Commonwealth
v. Gore, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 96, -, 480 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (1985) ("We refuse to
enlarge the Daye exception to include probable cause hearing testimony.").
NewJersey Rule of Evidence 63(1) incorporates the provision in subsection
(A) of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) as one class of statements and adds
another pertaining to statements contained in a sound recording or in a writing
made or signed by the witness under circumstances lending to its reliability. N.J.
R. EvID. 63(l). For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(A), see supra
note 32.
Ohio Rule of Evidence 801 (D)(1)(a) adopts the House Judicial Committee's
recommendation and provides that only those prior statements made subject to
cross-examination at a trial, hearing or in a deposition may be used as substan-
tive evidence. OHIO R. EVID. 801(D)(l)(a). For a discussion of the HouseJudi-
cial Committee's recommendation regarding substantive admissibility of a
witness' prior inconsistent statements, see supra notes 34-35.
103. State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86 (1986). For a discussion
of Whelan, see supra note 101 and infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
104. HAW. R. EvID. 802.1(1). For a discussion of Hawaii Rule of Evidence
802.1 (1), see infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
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In State v. Whelan,10 5 the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the
orthodox rule, but limited the scope of the modern rule to situations in
which the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated, is
subject to cross-examination concerning the prior statement. 10 6 More-
over, the Whelan court further required that the prior statement be re-
duced to a writing and signed by the declarant.
10 7
As an extension of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), Hawaii
Rule of Evidence 802.1(1) provides for the substantive admissibility of a
witness' prior inconsistent statements in three situations: where the
prior statement was given under oath at a formal legal proceeding or in
a deposition; where the statement was reduced to writing and signed or
adopted by the declarant; or where the statement was a contemporane-
ous verbatim recording.' 0 8 In addition, like other forms of the modern
105. 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86 (1986). In Whelan,. defendant was
charged with murder after stabbing another man during a barroom brawl. Id. at
745, 513 A.2d at 88. Defendant's claim of self-defense was defeated by evidence
contained in a witness' prior written statement which was introduced outside the
presence of the jury after the witness testified that he could not remember the
events in question. Id. at 746-47, 513 A.2d at 89. The witness had given this
statement to police shortly after the stabbing. Id. at 746, 513 A.2d at 89.
106. Id. at 753, 513 A.2d at 92.
107. Id. The Whelan court reasoned that the declarant realized his state-
ment would be relied upon, since oral statements are easily manufactured and
difficult to rebut, whereas written statements, though "not an absolute guaranty
of reliability, . . . provide significant assurance of an accurate rendition of the
statement." Id. at 754, 513 A.2d at 93. Though concerned about the reliability
of a witness' prior statements, the court did not find it necessary to restrict sub-
stantive admissibility to only those situations covered by Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(d)(1)(A). Id. at 754 n.10, 513 A.2d at 93 n.10. In fact, in dictum, the
court intimated that other statements not signed by the declarant may be admis-
sible if they are "reliable". See id. at 754-55, 513 A.2d 93-94. For example, the
court noted that prior tape-recorded statements possess indicia of reliability
similar to that found in written statements, and thus stated that such evidence
would also be admissible as substantive evidence. Id. at 754 n.9, 513 A.2d at 93
n.9.
108. HAW. R. EvID. 802.1(1). Hawaii Rule of Evidence 802.1 provides in
pertinent part:
The following statements previously made by witnesses who testify at
the trial or hearing are not excluded by the hearsay rule:
(1) Inconsistent Statement. The declarant is subject to cross-exami-
nation concerning the subject matter of his statement, the state-
ment is inconsistent with his testimony, the statement is offered in
compliance with rule 613(b) [governing use of prior inconsistent
statements for impeachment purposes], and the statement was:
(A) Given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition; or
(B) Reduced to writing and signed or otherwise adopted or ap-
proved by the declarant; or
(C) Recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic,
mechanical, electrical, or other means contemporaneously
with the making of the statement.
Id. The extension of this rule beyond Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(A) is
494 [Vol. 32: p. 471
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rule, 10 9 the Hawaii rule requires that the witness be subject to cross-
examination concerning the prior statement during the proceeding in
which the evidence is being offered for its substantive value.I 10
Both the Whelan rule and Hawaii Rule of Evidence 802.1 (1) are im-
portant because they represent a middle-of-the-road approach to sub-
stantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. Though more
rigid than the Brady rule, which provides for substantive admissibility so
long as the witness is subject to cross-examination, III the rules followed
in Connecticut and Hawaii do not restrict substantive admissibility to
the very narrow class of statements made in a formal adversarial context
modeled after a provision of the Jencks Act. HAw. R. EVID. 802.1 commentary
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1)-(2) (1982)).
The Jencks Act, which governs the discovery of statements made by wit-
nesses to federal agents, provides in pertinent part:
(e) The term "statement",... in relation to any witness called by the
United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him; [or]
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an
oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporane-
ously with the making of such oral statement.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1)-(2) (1982). The basic aim of this particular provision of
theJencks Act is to assure the reliability and trustworthiness of a witness' state-
ments. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 344, (1959). In Palermo, the
United States Supreme Court noted that the purpose of theJencks Act provision
is to produce a "carefully restricted and most trustworthy class of statements."
Id. The petitioner in Palermo was convicted of tax evasion, primarily on the basis
of his failure to report income from certain dividends. Id. at 343. The witness, a
partner at the accounting firm where petitioner did business, testified at trial
that certain relevant records had not been received by the firm until after an
investigation of petitioner had been initiated. Id. at 344. This testimony dif-
fered from prior statements by the witness to the effect that he could not remem-
ber when the records had been received. Id. The witness' prior statements were
made during the course of an interrogation conducted by IRS agents. Id. In
determining that petitioner was not entitled to discovery of a memorandum
which summarized the IRS interrogation, the Supreme Court noted that the
above provision of the Jencks Act was enacted to ensure that the words were
"the witness' own rather than the product of the investigator's selections, inter-
pretations and interpolations." Id. at 350. The Court went on to note that "[it
[is] important that the statement could fairly be deemed to reflect fully and with-
out distortion what had been said . I..." d. at 352.
109. See, e.g., Whelan, 200 Conn. at 753, 513 A.2d at 92; Brady, 510 Pa. at
131, 507 A.2d at 70; see also FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
For a discussion of Brady, see supra notes 56-77 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of Whelan, see supra notes 101, 105-07 and infra notes 111-12, and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A),
see supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
110. HAw. R. EVID. 802.1(1).
111. Brady, 510 Pa. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70. The Brady decision can also be
read to require that the out-of-court statement be deemed reliable. Id. at 133,
507 A.2d at 71. For a discussion of the Brady court's holding and rationale, see
supra notes 56-57, 65-77 and accompanying text.
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as does Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A).' 12
III. ANALYSIS
In Brady, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the majority
view that a non-party witness' prior inconsistent statements may be used
as substantive evidence.' 13 Although the court adopted what it consid-
ered to be the "better, more principled view" regarding the use of prior
inconsistent statements,' 14 it is submitted that the Brady rule is overly
broad and fails to adequately ensure the reliability of prior out-of-court
declarations.
In Brady, the court noted that the facts presented "a classic case" in
which to hold that a witness' prior statement is admissible for its sub-
stantive value.' 15 Because the witness' prior statement was rendered
under "highly reliable circumstances" and was presented to the court in
the form of a verbatim recording, the Brady court emphasized that there
was never any concern about the reliability of the statement.1 16 Like-
wise, there was no concern over the reliability of the statements admit-
ted in Wilson, where the witness made her prior statement during a
preliminary hearing.' 17 Yet, despite the reliability of the statements in
112. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A). For a discussion of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(d)(1)(A), see supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
113. 510 Pa. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70.
114. Id. at 130, 507 A.2d at 70. For a discussion of Brady, see supra notes
56-77 and accompanying text.
115. 510 Pa. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated that to deny substantive admissibility of the witness' prior tape-recorded
statement, and thus relieve the witness from having to explain or deny the state-
ment in light of her in-court testimony, would deny the jury its "most powerful
tool in evaluating [a witness'] veracity." Id. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71 (quoting trial
court in same case).
116. The Brady court stated, "The out-of-court declaration was rendered
under highly reliable circumstances assuring that they [sic] were voluntary,
knowing and understanding." 510 Pa. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71. Moreover, the
court noted that the witness was extensively questioned by both parties regard-
ing the statement. Id. The court also noted that the extensive questioning gave
the jury an adequate opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor and assess
her credibility. Id. As a result, the court concluded that under such circum-
stances, the lower court was correct in allowing the witness' prior statement to
be admitted as substantive evidence of appellee's guilt. Id. For a full discussion
of Brady, see supra notes 56-77 and accompanying text.
117. Wilson, 97 Pa. Commw. at 203, 509 A.2d at 1336. For a full discussion
of Wilson, see supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text. Cf Whelan, 200 Conn.
743, 513 A.2d 86 (1986). In Whelan, the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted
the modern rule but limited it to those prior statements reduced to a writing and
signed by the declarant who has personal knowledge of the events described in
that writing. 200 Conn. at 753, 513 A.2d at 92. In formulating this approach,
the court noted that written statements, though not made during a formal pro-
ceeding, have sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant substantive admissibility.
Id. at 754, 513 A.2d at 92-93. For a discussion of Whelan, see supra notes 101,
105-07, 111-12 and accompanying text.
Thus, it is submitted that statements made during the course of a prelimi-
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss2/4
Brady and Wilson, there will undoubtedly be situations in which proof of
both the existence and the accuracy of a witness' prior inconsistent state-
ments will not be so reliable, such as where the sole proof and content
of a.witness' prior statements rests with the testimony of another per-
son.' 18 In such a situation the possibility of misinterpretation and even
abuse in the form of fabrication is greatly increased.' 19
Another related problem with the Brady decision is that the court
never explained whether, under its version of the modern rule, the de-
clarant would be required to have personal knowledge of the facts un-
derlying the out-of-court statement. Although the Brady court noted
that the declarant's statement in that case was "highly reliable" because
it was "voluntary, knowing and understanding," it did not explain
whether its reference to "knowing" referred to a personal knowledge
requirement. 120 Moreover, if the court's reference to "knowing" was
meant to refer to a personal knowledge requirement, the court did not
articulate whether it would require personal knowledge that the state-
ment was made or personal knowledge of the facts underlying the state-
ment. 12 1 It is submitted that by not explicitly requiring the declarant to
have personal knowledge of the facts stated, the Brady court created an
nary hearing, as in Wilson where the declarant was subject to contemporaneous
cross-examination, possess such strong indicia of reliability that they would be
admissible under the Whelan standard. In fact, such statements would be admis-
sible under the stricter federal standard, which specifically limits admissibility to
those statements made while the declarant was under oath at a formal proceed-
ing. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A). For a full discussion of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801 (d)(1)(A), see supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 38, at 1589 ("[T]he most untrustworthy
declaration... [is] the unacknowledged oral statement."); see also Green, 399 U.S.
at 151 (only proof of witness' initial statement implicating respondent as drug
dealer rested with testimony of police officer present when statement was made);
Whelan, 200 Conn. at 752-53, 513 A.2d at 92 (prior oral statements present pos-
sibility of "error in reporting" and create "opportunity for fabrication and dis-
tortion by witnesses"). For a full discussion of Green, see supra notes 12-31 and
accompanying text. For a full discussion of Whelan, see supra notes 101, 105-07,
111-12 and accompanying text.
119. See Graham, supra note 38, at 1585. Graham notes that "a witness'
prior statement that he heard a criminal defendant make an incriminating admis-
sion ... [is] most open to fabrication." Id.
120. See 510 Pa. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71. Although the declarant in Brady did
have personal knowledge of the facts stated, the court never made this an ex-
plicit requirement. See id. But see Whelan, 200 Conn. at 753, 513 A.2d at 92(requiring personal knowledge of facts stated); Graham, supra note 38, at 1584-
86 (advocating personal knowledge requirement to exclude from substantive ad-
missibility statements most open to fabrication); McCormick, Turncoat Witness,
supra note 5, at 588 (recommending that declarant have opportunity to observe
facts stated).
121. See Brady, 510 Pa. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71. Graham has suggested that
requiring the declarant to possess personal knowledge of the stated facts
reduces the chance for fabrication and assures the opportunity for effective
cross-examination. Graham, supra note 38, at 1585. This would effectively test
the reliability of the prior statement, Id.
1987] NOTE
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ambiguity which could result in the admission of highly unreliable
evidence. '
22
Therefore, even though the Brady court provided some guidance for
lower courts to follow in determining the reliability and accuracy of a
witness' prior inconsistent statements, 12 3 it is submitted that the court
should have been more specific in limiting the application of the modern
rule.124 It is submitted that such a limitation would prevent any possible
abuse of the modern rule.
Concern over the reliability of a witness' prior statements has
prompted many other jurisdictions to limit the modern rule. 12 5 Most of
these limitations come in the form of statutory provisions that regulate
the circumstances under which the prior statements must have been
made in order to be admissible as substantive evidence.12 6 Such provi-
sions are aimed at ensuring that the statements were actually made as
well as guaranteeing the accuracy and truthfulness of what was said. 12 7
122. See Graham, supra note 38, at 1585. For a discussion of the rationale
which underlies the requirement of personal knowledge, see supra note 121.
123. For a discussion of the guidance given by the Brady court, see supra
notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
124. See Whelan, 200 Conn. at 752, 513 A.2d at 92 ("Although we are im-
pressed by the logic of the modern view favoring substantive admissibility for...
prior inconsistent statements . . . we are unwilling to abrogate [the orthodox
rule], without adequate precautions .... "). The precautions taken by the Whe-
lan court involved limiting substantive admissibility to prior written statements
signed by the declarant. Id. at 753, 513 A.2d at 92. The Whelan court noted that,
while the requirements it imposed did not provide an "absolute guaranty of reli-
ability," they nonetheless provided "significant assurance of an accurate rendi-
tion of the statement and that the declarant realized it would be relied upon."
Id. at 754, 513 A.2d at 93. However, the court also noted that prior tape-re-
corded statements, though not within the ambit of signed and written state-
ments, possess sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant substantive
admissibility. Id. at 754 n.9, 513 A.2d at 93 n.9 (citing Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507
A.2d 66 (1986)) (dictum). For a full discussion of Whelan, see supra notes 101,
105-07, 111-12 and accompanying text.
125. For a discussion of the rules adopted by these other jurisdictions, see
supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. These states have either restricted
admissibility by imposing the same limitation contained in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(d)(l)(A), or by adopting some other limiting provision which may
either increase admissibility over that allowed by the federal standard or restrict
it even further, as in the case of Michigan Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) and Ohio
Rule of Evidence 801(D)(l)(a). For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(l)(A), see supra note 32. For a list of states adopting verbatim reenact-
ments of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), see supra notes 96, 98-99 and
accompanying text. For a list of states adopting variations or extensions of the
modern rule, see supra notes 100, 102 and accompanying text. For the text and
a discussion of Michigan Rule of Evidence 801, see supra note 91. For a discus-
sion of Ohio Rule of Evidence 801(D)(l)(a), see supra note 102.
126. See, e.g., HAW. R. EviD. 802.1(1). Hawaii Rule 802.1(1) provides for
three specific classes of statements that are admissible for their substantive
value. For a general discussion of Hawaii Rule of Evidence 802.1 (1), see supra
notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974
498 [Vol. 32: p. 471
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An example of such a statutory limitation on the modern rule is
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A). 128 While the rule is acknowl-
edged to be a valid device for ensuring that only the most reliable prior
statements are admitted as substantive evidence, 12 9 many criticize it as
being too restrictive. 13 0 Legal commentators have noted that the fed-
eral rule denies substantive admissibility to prior statements, which,
though reliable, were rendered under less formal circumstances than is
acceptable under that rule.' 3 ' For example, under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(d)(1)(A), the prior statement of the witness in Brady would
not have been admissible as substantive evidence, despite the highly re-
liable circumstances under which it was made.' 3 2 This is solely because
the statement was not made under oath subject to the penalty of perjury
at a formal legal proceeding as the federal rule requires.1 33
The federal rule has also been criticized as leading to jury confu-
sion, because statements inadmissible for use as substantive evidence
under its provisions may still be used to impeach the witness' testi-
mony.13 4 In such a situation, the jury is likely to use the statements as
substantive evidence despite an instruction by the court to the con-
trary. 13 5 Thus it is submitted that, while Federal Rule of Evidence
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7087 (requirement that statements be
made under oath and subject to cross-examination during a formal proceeding
ensures that statement was made; context itself provides assurances of
reliability).
128. For a discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(l)(A), see supra
notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
129. See Graham, supra note 38, at 1582-83 (federal rule enacted to limit
admissibility to "situations in which the likelihood of total fabrication was practi-
cally nonexistent," yet such safeguards are "overly strict").
130. For a full discussion of such criticism, see supra note 44. For the text
of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(A), see supra note 32.
131. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 38, at 1567 (federal rule "unduly restricts
the types of prior inconsistent statements substantively admissible thereunder");
Ordover, Rules Analysis, supra note 3, at 69 ("informality of the prior statement
ought not render it automatically unreliable"; circumstances under which state-
ment was made and quality of subsequent cross-examination should determine
whether statement is reliable enough to admit as substantive evidence).
132. For the text of FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A), see supra note 32. The wit-
ness in Brady had made her statement to police at the station house, where it was
contemporaneously recorded in the presence of the witness' mother and her
attorney. 510 Pa. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70. Since Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A) requires that the out-of-court statement be made under oath, the
statement in Brady would not be admissible. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
133. For the text and a general discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence
801 (d) (1) (A), see supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 4 & 52. McCormick notes that confining substantive
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements to those made during the course of
a formal proceeding will confuse the jury, since the use of such statements for
impeachment purposes is unlimited in the federal system. C. MCCORMICK, Evi-
DENCE, supra note 3, § 251, at 747.
135. See, e.g., McCormick, Turncoat Witness, supra note 5, at 580 (instruction
limiting use of statement to impeachment is "verbal ritual"; jurors unlikely to
NOTE
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801(d)(1) (A) achieves its purpose in guaranteeing the reliability of a wit-
ness' prior inconsistent statements, it does so at the expense of other
equally reliable statements which are then relegated to use solely for
their impeachment value.
Although the Whelan decision represents a more liberal view of sub-
stantive admissibility than Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A),' 3 6 it
too specifically excludes statements which possess strong indicia of relia-
bility.' 37 Like the Brady court, the Connecticut Supreme Court failed to
give any guidance as to when, if ever, statements other than those writ-
ten and signed by the declarant would be admissible. 138 Moreover,
though the Whelan court placed much emphasis on the reliability of writ-
ten statements,' 39 it failed to note that written as well as oral statements
are subject to "distortion."' 40 Commentators, however, point out that
understand it, and will thus ignore it); Morgan, supra note 6, at 193 (despite
limiting instruction, practice of restricting admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements to impeachment unlikely to prevent jurors from considering evi-
dence for its substantive value).
136. See Whelan, 200 Conn. at 754 n.10, 513 A.2d at 93 n.10 (unnecessary to
limit substantive admissibility to statements made under oath in formal proceed-
ing as required under federal rule).
137. See id. at 753, 513 A.2d at 92 (rule only permits substantive admissibil-
ity of prior written statements signed by declarant possessing personal knowl-
edge). Though the Whelan court noted in dictum that prior tape-recorded
statements also possess indicia of reliability and trustworthiness, it did not spe-
cifically include that category of statements in its holding. Id. at 754 n.9, 513
A.2d at 93 n.9.
138. See id, at 754-55, 513 A.2d at 93 (noting only that statement was given
voluntarily soon after events had occurred, that statement was based on per-
sonal knowledge and that statement was reliable because declarant would be
subjected to prosecution for rendering false statement to police if account found
to be untrue).
139. Id. at 754, 513 A.2d at 93. The court stated that, unlike prior oral
statements which are easily fabricated, prior written statements provide "signifi-
cant assurance" that the statements were accurately rendered and that declarant
knew they would be relied upon. Id. The Whelan court also noted that errors in
transcription are rare and that widespread methods of detecting forgery or alter-
ation make prior written statements more reliable than prior oral statements. Id.
at 754, 513 A.2d at 92-93.
140. See Graham, supra note 38, at 1573-74 n.25 (quoting Hearings on II.R.
5464 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974) (state-
ment of Herbert Semmel)). Graham points out that prior written statements are
subject to "inaccurate repetition, ambiguity and incompleteness" and often re-
flect the "subjective interest and attitude" of the examiner. Id. (quoting Hearings
on H.R. 5464 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302
(1974) (statement of Herbert Semmel)). Graham notes that skilled investigators
such as policemen and attorneys can often hear a witness' account of an event
and then prepare a written statement which, by omitting adverse facts and
changing emphasis, reflects their own interests rather than an objective account
of the events at issue. Id. (quoting Hearings on H.R. 5464 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974) (statement of Herbert Semmel)).
This often occurs where the statement pertains to a crime that has become con-
troversial or has aroused public interest so that there is great pressure on the
police to bring a suspect to trial and great pressure on the prosecutor to get a
500 [Vol. 32: p. 471
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oral statements still pose a greater danger of inaccuracy than written
statements. 141
It is submitted that Pennsylvania should limit its application of the
modern rule in a manner similar to that provided by Hawaii Rule of
Evidence 802.1(1).142 The Hawaii rule incorporates the provisions of
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) as one class of statements to be
admitted substantively.1 4 3 Yet the Hawaii rule also recognizes the relia-
bility and value of certain statements not made during formal legal pro-
ceedings; namely, written statements signed and adopted by the witness
and contemporaneous verbatim recordings of the witness' state-
ments. 14 4 By limiting the Brady rule in such a way, Pennsylvania courts
would provide adequate assurances of reliability without unduly restrict-
ing competent evidence from substantive admissibility. 1
4 5
conviction. Id. (quoting Hearings on H.R. 5464 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974) (statement of Herbert Semmel)). But see
Ordover, Rules Analysis, supra note 3, at 76 (fear that counsel will carefully draft
statement is overstated because of opportunity for cross-examination at trial).
The Whelan court noted only that while prior written statements do not provide
an "absolute guaranty of reliability," they do provide "significant assurance" of
reliability in rendition and notice to the declarant that the statement would be
relied upon. Whelan, 200 Conn. at 754, 513 A.2d at 93.
141. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 38, at 1573-74 n.25 (quoting Hearings on
H.R. 5464 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974)
(statement of Herbert Semmel)) (problems in accuracy and incompleteness
'more acute" in prior oral statements); McCormick, Turncoat Witness, supra note
5, at 588 (danger of "error or falsity" less where prior written statements sought
to be admitted as substantive evidence).
142. For the text and a general discussion of Hawaii Rule of Evidence
802.1 (1), see supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text. Though Pennsylvania
has codified some of its rules of evidence, most remain uncodified. See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6101-44 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (codified rules of evidence).
Thus, a change in the Brady rule could be brought about by judicial modification
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or by legislative enactment.
143. See HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1)(A). This is one of three classes of prior
statements that the Hawaii legislature has deemed reliable enough to be admis-
sible as substantive evidence. For the text and a general discussion of Hawaii
Rule of Evidence 802.1(1), see supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
144. See HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1)(B)-(C). Subsection (1)(B) provides for the
admissibility of written statements which have been signed, adopted or ap-
proved by the declarant. Id. 802.1(1)(B). Such statements, according to the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, are reliable enough to warrant their admissibil-
ity as substantive evidence of their content. Whelan, 200 Conn. at 754, 513 A.2d
at 92-93 (1986) ("Errors in transcription are rare and methods of detecting and
establishing forgery or alteration are widely available."). Similarly, subsection
(1)(C) of the Hawaii rule provides for the admissibility of substantially verbatim,
contemporaneous recordings of a witness' statements. See HAW. R. EvID.
802.1(1)(C). This was the type of statement involved in Brady, where the court
noted that the witness' statements had been rendered under highly reliable cir-
cumstances. 510 Pa. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71. For a full discussion of Brady, see
supra notes 56-77 and accompanying text.
145. See HAW. R. EvID. 802.1 commentary (provisions of rule guarantee
trustworthiness of statements and also allow jury to "determine where the truth
lies").
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Under the Hawaii rule, evidence like that admitted in Green, where
the sole proof and representation of the witness' prior oral statement
rested with the testimony of a police officer, would not be admissible for
its substantive value.146 Under this rule, however, evidence like that in
Brady, where the witness' statements were tape-recorded in the presence
of her attorney, would be admissible as substantive evidence even
though they were not made under oath subject to the penalty of perjury
as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (A). 14 7
In addition to limiting the application of the modern rule in a man-
ner similar to Hawaii Rule of Evidence 802.1(1), Pennsylvania should
also consider requiring that the prior statement be corroborated by
other evidence in the case.' 48 It is submitted that the degree of such
corroboration, or whether the statement contains sufficient indicia of re-
liability so as not to require corroboration and its attendant guarantee of
trustworthiness, should be left to the court's discretion in light of the
particular facts of the case before it.1 49 Corroboration would be espe-
cially appropriate where the witness denies that an oral out-of-court
statement was made,' 50 or where the witness asserts that a written or
146. See HAw. R. EVID. 802.1(1). For a discussion of the Hawaii rule, see
supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text. The witness' initial statement was
given to a police officer at the station house. Green, 399 U.S. at 151. The state-
ment was not rendered during a formal proceeding, where the witness would
have been under oath subject to the penalty of perjury; it was not reduced to a
writing which was signed or otherwise adopted by the witness; and it was not
contemporaneously recorded or transcribed. See id. at 151-52. Because the
statement fails to comply with any of the above three requirements for admissi-
bility under Hawaii Rule of Evidence 802.1 (1), it would not be admitted for its
substantive value. See HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1).
147. See HAW. R. EvID. 802.1(1)(C). For the text of Hawaii Rule of Evi-
dence 802.1(1), see supra note 108.
148. See Brady, 510 Pa. at 126 n.l, 507 A.2d at 67 n.1. Although the Brady
court noted that the statements at issue were corroborated by physical evidence
and other testimony, it is not clear how much weight the court gave to this factor
in holding that the statements were admissible for their substantive value. See id.
149. See id. The Brady court, in analyzing the facts and reliability of the
witness' tape-recorded statement, noted that "significant" portions of the state-
ment were corroborated by other evidence in the case. Id. Though the Brady
court apparently considered this factor in determining that the statement was
sufficiently reliable to warrant its admissibility as substantive evidence, the Con-
necticut Supreme Court, in Whelan, noted that corroboration could present
problems where less reliable oral statements are offered for substantive admissi-
bility. Whelan, 200 Conn. at 753, 513 A.2d at 92. The Whelan court noted that
oral statements "made in jest or to boast of knowledge of criminal activity in
which the declarant was not actually involved" are difficult to explain and might
be determinative of guilt where other evidence of guilt is present. Id. Thus, in
determining whether to admit a statement for its substantive value, the court's
ability to consider, at its discretion, the impact of corroborating evidence and its
potential dangers becomes important.
150. Cf. Graham, supra note 38, at 1590-91. Corroborating evidence in this
instance allows the proponent of the statement to prove to the court, and ulti-
mately the jury, that the statement was actually made. Id.
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recorded out-of-court statement was either forged or altered in some
way. 151 It is submitted that this would further ensure both the reliability
and truthfulness of the witness' prior statement without imposing a rigid
exclusion of certain classes of evidence.1 52
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Brady sub-
stantially modernized the commonwealth's approach to the substantive
admissibility of a non-party witness' prior inconsistent statements, there
are concerns about reliability which can only be addressed through a
limitation of the rule adopted in that case. It is submitted that by limit-
ing the rule so as to admit only those statements which bear sufficient
indicia of reliability, the chances of abuse through fabrication and even
misinterpretation will be greatly reduced. At the same time, it is submit-
ted that evidence vital to the fact-finder's search will not be withheld due
to the mere technicality that the statements were made outside of a for-
mal adversarial proceeding.
Jennifer L. Hilliard
151. See id. While it is admitted that under the rule that this Note suggests
should be adopted in Pennsylvania, it would be difficult for a witness to deny
making a prior statement, the witness can still allege that the prior statement is
incorrect. See id. For a discussion of the proposed rule, see supra notes 142-49
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problems associated with prior
written statements, see supra note 140 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the Brady court's use of corroborating evidence,
see supra note 149 and accompanying text. It is submitted that a discretionary
corroboration requirement would allow the courts to consider such evidence
only when relevant to the issue of reliability without requiring a per se exclusion
of uncorroborated prior statements. For a discussion of the Whelan court's res-
ervations about corroborating evidence, see supra note 149.
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